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ABSTRACT
Laws that recognise rivers and their ecosystems as legal persons or
subjects with their own rights, duties and obligations have been
associated with theories of environmental constitutionalism.
However, the extent to, and manner in which, constitutional law
(with its elevated status) has been instrumental in the conferral of
these ‘riverine rights’ is still not well-understood. In this article,
we consider the constitutional relevance of the recognition of
rivers as legal persons or subjects in Aotearoa New Zealand,
Colombia and India. We argue that in these three countries
riverine rights are constitutional experiments: as small-scale, ad
hoc and ultimately incomplete attempts to transcend seemingly
ineffective regulatory frameworks for rivers. However, they are
also incremental, and influential, steps in a broader project of
more fundamental social and environmental reform.
1. Introduction
The recognition or bestowal of legal rights on the Atrato, Ganges and Yamuna, and
Whanganui rivers (Table 1) has attracted intense interest in transnational scholarship.
Like other novel, yet incipient, legal developments, much of this attention focuses on
the ‘transformative’ potential of the legal person model1 – to rebalance the power
dynamics between humans and nature and enable real social and ecological change.
Laws that recognise rivers and their ecosystems as legal persons or subjects with their
own rights, duties and obligations, have been associated with theories of ‘environmental
constitutionalism’; the constitutional incorporation of substantive and procedural
environmental rights, responsibilities, and remedies to protect the natural environment.2
These are attempts to ‘transcend “normal” politics and law, reaching deep into the moral
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fabric of a society that seeks to be good, as expressed through its constitutionalised pol-
itical and legal order’.3
There is a broad range of existing and prospective models that position rivers as hav-
ing some form of rights or personality around the world.4 These include a mixture of
judicial, administrative and legislative examples; made at various levels of government
from local to international; concerning various types of ecosystems from specific rivers
to broader manifestations of ‘nature’; and involving a range of legal mechanisms such
as rights of nature, legal or juristic persons or subjects, or models that recognise rivers
or ecosystems as living entities.5 For convenience, we use the term ‘riverine rights’ to
very loosely group the ‘cases’6 from Colombia, India and Aotearoa New Zealand dis-
cussed in this article, although we acknowledge and accept the conceptual and practical
differences between places, peoples and contexts, and undertake a contextualised and
nuanced analysis of each case.
Despite their different circumstances, those driving riverine rights in these seemingly
disparate cases have sought to elevate certain fundamental and inviolable interests (both
of the river and sometimes of themselves), above the everyday business of river manage-
ment. Put practically, certain interest groups (e.g. local communities, Indigenous peoples,
NGOs, and even judges and politicians) have attempted to leverage riverine rights to ‘win
their battles’ (including but not limited to claims for control and access) with respect to
rivers; appealing to higher-level norms which have the potential to transcend dominant
regulatory approaches and distributions.7 These claims appeal to constitutional law’s
elevated status – with its hierarchy of ‘special powers’, which take priority over ‘ordinary’
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3Kotzé (2017), p 191.
4The expanding list includes (without limit) the Whanganui river in Aotearoa New Zealand; a number of rivers (including
the Atrato) in Colombia; the Ganges and Yamuna in India; all rivers in Bangladesh; the Yarra river in Australia; and (more
recently) the Magpie River in Canada.
5See Tănăsescu (forthcoming) and O’Donnell et al (2020). The existing research does little to theorise the differences
between the various ‘rights of nature’ models with the exception of Tănăsescu and O’Donnell et al Tănăsescu’s
recent work helpfully draws a distinction between what he calls ‘ecotheological’ approaches that recognise rights
for nature broadly (like the Ecuadorian Constitution) and place-based legal person models like in Aotearoa, which
have distinct conceptual underpinnings. We acknowledge that the three riverine rights cases discussed in this
article rely on a combination of ecotheological and place-based concepts.
6We refer to these as ‘cases’ for heuristic reasons, although we note that the three examples involve different types of
legal mechanisms and models, including statutory approaches.
7See Kauffman and Martin (2019), p 20.
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laws. Yet, there is often said to be an ‘implementation gap’8 in environmental constitu-
tionalism; i.e. constitutions and their enforcers may well produce ambitious normative
agendas about transformative environmental change, but these ambitions lead to little
impact on the ground.9
It is with this potential and ambivalence in mind that we ask in this article: To what
extent, and in what ways, has constitutional law (with its elevated status) been instrumen-
tal in the conferral of riverine rights? We choose to investigate this question through an
exploratory comparative study of the three jurisdictions that are typically used as exem-
plars in contemporary literature and commentary for applying rights-based approaches
to rivers: Colombia, India and Aotearoa New Zealand.10 All three countries have recog-
nised rivers as legal persons/subjects in varying ways and to varying degrees since 2016.11
In doing so we consider whether the three riverine rights cases reflect the pragmatism of
rights-based claims and strategic socio-ecological litigation and reform. We also consider
whether the three riverine rights cases might be the result of activists ‘learning to play the
legal game better’ or of judges, lawyers and politicians seeking to ‘make their mark’
through novel legal mechanisms inspired by alternative value-systems.
In our enquiry, we seek to make some broader observations relevant to the project of
‘transnational comparative environmental constitutionalism’.12 By taking an interdisci-
plinary approach drawing on law and political and anthropological theory, we consider
whether constitutions (broadly framed) are in fact the enablers of change they are often
described to be, against the background of the complex political power dynamics of the
specific cases. We take a broad approach to assessing ‘change’, ‘adaptation’ and ‘reform’,
as socio-ecological phenomena. For example, we cannot measure improvements to the
health of the river within the period, but we can make observations about the broader
health of riverine communities as socio-ecological networks. We do not therefore seek
to ascertain the extent to which riverine rights are practically or effectively implemented
in each of the country studies (other than as reported in the academic literature), instead
focusing on the design and content of legal and policy frameworks in their specific
context.
We explore the constitutional significance of the three riverine rights cases via a
detailed interdisciplinary study of the law, policy and scholarship relating to each case
in its historical, political and cultural context.13 Our transdisciplinary and transnational
research team includes researchers from all three countries, fluent in the language and
‘legal language’ of each country.14 We do not presume, however, to speak for Indigenous,
Afro descendent or local peoples.
8Daly and May (2018), p 4. See also Boyd (2012).
9This is especially the case in less-developed countries. See, e.g. Richardson and McNeish (2021).
10Hereafter, ‘New Zealand’, for brevity only.
11Our choice to focus on these countries is aided by them being the first three countries to provide (significantly) for
riverine rights, with the largest amount of data available.
12See Kotzé (2017). See also Venter and Kotzé (2017).
13We define ‘law’ very broadly (in line with a socio-legal methodology) to include not just ‘law in the books’ but the
expression of rights, entitlements and obligations in written and unwritten (customary) normative frameworks and
socio-political strategies for environmental protection or access (legislation, case law, government and community
policy and planning documents). See Hirschl (2014), p 13.
14See Curran (2006) on ‘legal language’.
GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW 3
We find that each of the three riverine rights cases, although quite different in its
workings and context, has constitutional significance.15 Each case is an attempt to
reset the political power dynamics between governments and communities/interest
groups. Each case uses the language of ‘rights’ to secure environmental and social objec-
tives, and attempts to elevate those rights above ordinary regulation, appealing to consti-
tutional norms. This may be done for a range of reasons, including (but not limited to)
the furtherance of Indigenous political claims for self-determination over river govern-
ance and use; the influence of transnational environmental non-governmental organis-
ations (NGOs) and the global rights of nature project;16 and the personal ambitions of
creative lawyers, politicians and judges who wish to ‘make their mark’.17
We find that the riverine rights cases do not completely succeed in their transforma-
tive endeavour, and each case has significant shortcomings in terms of the ability to
transcend dominant regulatory regimes, and thereby they may have limited potential
to enable real legal and practical change. Despite this, we argue, the riverine rights
cases from Colombia, India and New Zealand can be characterised as tentative early
steps towards more transformative change, and their broader influence throughout the
legal and institutional culture of each country, can already be seen.
2. Environmental constitutionalism: conceptual tensions
2.1. The normative superiority of constitutional law
Constitutional law appeals to environmental lawyers because of its potential to transcend
‘ordinary’ regulation via the setting of high-level norms, which reflect fundamental
human needs, principles, values or interests. This is important because changes in con-
stitutional norms, or their interpretation, have the power to affect all other norms in a
given legal system. According to May and Daly, ‘Environmental constitutionalism
offers a way forward when other legal mechanisms fall short’.18
Constitutions take many different forms in comparative experience. There are written
constitutions, including the French or Roman law derived constitutions typical of civil
law countries,19 like Colombia.20 There are also unwritten constitutions, which may be
spread across a combination of fundamental texts, prerogatives and doctrines of com-
mon law, typical of ‘Westminster system’ countries colonised by the British, like New
Zealand.21 Finally, there are traditions that bridge the ‘divide’, and include a mixture
of civil style codified constitutions, common law doctrines and pluralist norms, like
India.22 Despite formal and contextual differences amongst and between constitutions
around the world, ‘comparative constitutionalism’ – the ‘transnational migration of
15We discuss the meaning of constitutionalism, and environmental constitutionalism in the following section and note, at
the outset, that the concept of constitutional significance can be difficult to define, but we use it in the sense of alluding
to constitutional law’s elevated or superior status over ‘ordinary’ law and regulation.
16See also Tănăsescu (forthcoming).
17See also Kauffman and Martin (2019), p 20.
18May and Daly (2015), p 18.
19On Latin American constitutionalism see Adelman (2014), p 508; Gargarella (2014).
20Constitución Política de Colombia [Political Constitution of Colombia] 1991 (COL).
21Joseph (2014), p 4. Joseph refers to New Zealand’s constitution as, ‘cocktail of Westminster inheritance and local
innovation’.
22Abeyratne (2018), p 307; Ram-Prasad (2013), p 676.
4 E. MACPHERSON ET AL.
constitutional ideas’ – has become ‘a cornerstone of constitutional jurisprudence and
constitution-making in an increasing number of countries worldwide’.23This transna-
tional comparative constitutionalism has spread with reference to, but mostly indepen-
dent of, international norms, which may set the tone for transformative constitutional
agendas,24 but are notoriously difficult to implement ‘on the ground’.25
Constitutions serve a very important purpose in the legal systems of domestic countries.
In liberal democratic theory, constitutions are the source of protection for fundamental
human rights and needs, seen necessary to protect people from the tyranny of govern-
ments, pursuant to ideals like ‘limited government’ and the ‘rule of law’.26 Additionally,
constitutions provide for positive obligations, stemming from the emergence of thewelfare
state, that spell out state duties to provide for the well-being of the people.27 A key charac-
teristic of constitutions is their ‘normative superiority’ above ‘ordinary laws’.28 They are
sometimes described as ‘supreme law’,29 especially where they entail the power for courts
to ‘strike down’ acts that are inconsistent with or contravene them.30
The contents of constitutions typically include provisions that limit the power of the
state, provisions that distribute power within various branches of government, and pro-
visions that protect the rights of individuals.31 Constitutions usually make a distinction
between the rules for political decision-making (procedure), and the decisions them-
selves (substance).32 This, Grimm explains, insulates fundamental values and processes
from day to day pressures and conflicts, making the constitution stable yet adaptive to
uncertainty and change.33
Because of constitutions’ elevated status and shared values, people may be more likely
to respect and follow them than ordinary laws and regulations concerned with more-
mundane aspects of daily life.34 However, constitutions are implemented through admin-
istrative decision-making, and usually enforced by specialist constitutional courts, or the
highest levels of the judiciary. Their implementation is most effective where consti-
tutional norms are ‘self-executing’, meaning that they can be enforced directly by the
courts without secondary legislation.35 They have even stronger normative force and
stability where the constitution is ‘entrenched’, meaning that a certain increased parlia-
mentary majority is needed to change it.36
Constitutions are typically seen as a model standard for legitimacy; a statement of
what is right and what is wrong for a whole public to aspire to, forming part of ‘the social
contract’.37 Constitutions are, ‘the highest expression of legal ideals in any legal order,
23Hirschl (2014), p 3; see also Ginsburg and Dixon (2011). See also Geiringer (2019), p 281 who shows how constitutional
theories, as well as constitutional law is migrating as part of this transnational constitutionalism.
24Kotzé (2017), pp 11, 110. See also May and Daly (2015), p 31.
25Daly and May (2018), pp 1–2.
26Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg (2018), p 239.
27Singh (2018), p 652.
28May and Daly (2015), p 33; Grimm (2005), p 193.
29Joseph (2014), p 20.
30Palmer et al (2016).
31May and Daly (2015), p 38.
32Grimm (2005), p 194.
33Grimm (2005), p 194; Kotzé (2018), p 17.
34May and Daly (2015), p 33.
35Daly and May (2018), p 77.
36Hein (2020), p 79,
37Bosselmann (2008), p 169. See also Grimm (2005), p 194.
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providing the clearest manifestation and evidence of a social order’s values and guiding
principles’.38 As such, they represent the most venerated part of a legal system, and have
been called a ‘sacred text’.39
Because of constitutions’ normative superiority, and implied legitimacy, they have
been used in comparative history as vehicles for transformative structural changes: the
Latin American constitutions of the twentieth century being a clear example.40 Although
it should be remembered that constitutions, as a ‘hegemonic’ liberal democratic ideal,
have not always recognised legal and cultural pluralism, whereby ‘large subaltern popu-
lations (often comprising distinct racial or ethnic minorities) were kept at arm’s length
from full economic or political participation’.41 In particular, the constitutional legiti-
macy of settler colonial states is often assumed, without any legal or moral justification,
especially in the absence of fair treaties, agreements and power-sharing with Indigenous
peoples.42 Further, constitutions are not necessarily a stable bastion for legitimacy, even
where they are entrenched, and some countries (for example, in Latin America) have had
multiple, successive constitutions (some of which have been used to justify tyrannical
state acts) in a relatively short period of time.43 This empirical reality casts doubt on con-
stitutionalism’s claim to moral superiority, and raises real implications for the rule of law.
2.2. Environmental law and constitutionalism: the next level?
Environmental lawyers, scholars, judges and activists, frustrated by the inability of
‘ordinary’ regulation to respond to environmental concerns, are increasingly interested
in constitutionalism, including learning from its use in other countries.44Because
environmental degradation is ‘one of the most pressing concerns in modern times’,
Kotzé contends that environmental care has been elevated ‘from the “ordinary” legal
level to the “higher”, more enduring, constitutional level’.45 Thus, Kotzé argues, environ-
mental values belong among the fundamental values that are enshrined in a constitution;
environmental protection is among those concerns for which the state should be respon-
sible; and this obligation belongs to that set of higher-order laws to which ordinary laws
need to conform.46
Over the last three decades, the provision for environmental protection or rights in
national constitutions has expanded dramatically, and it is estimated that 150 consti-
tutions now have some reference to environmental protection.47 While the UN Confer-
ence on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972 is sometimes credited with
initiating the drive towards environmental constitutionalism,48 the great majority of
these environmental references have been included after 1990.49 This is partly because
38Kotzé (2018), p 16.
39Benedict (1987).
40Adelman (2014); Gargarella (2014).
41Ginsburg, Huq, and Versteeg (2018), p 240.
42Jones (2016), p 28.
43Adelman (2014); Gargarella (2014).
44See, e.g. Bosselmann (2008), p 159.
45Kotzé (2012), p 207.
46Kotzé (2012). See also May and Daly (2015), p 1.
47O’Gorman (2017).
48Boyd (2011). See also Shelton (2006).
49May (2006); Gellers (2017)
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many domestic constitutions were rewritten from the 1990s onwards (providing oppor-
tunities for including environmental protections), but also due to growing international
awareness about environmental issues. The growth in normative environmental pro-
visions has been accompanied by a trend towards judicialisation of politics, in which
‘the domain of the litigator and the judge has radically expanded’ and activist lawyers
and judges are increasingly producers of legal reform, especially in the constitutional
law field of ‘rights’.50
The linking of environmental interests to existing procedural and substantive human
rights protection has, in fact, cleared the way for the project of global environmental con-
stitutionalism. This is the case because, in most legal systems, human rights already have
constitutional status so slotting environmental rights alongside them gives similar sta-
tus.51 The connection between human rights and environmental rights is evident in prin-
ciple 1 of the Stockholm Declaration, which reads:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.52
Many countries now include the ‘right to a clean and healthy environment’ in their
national constitution,53 which have been called ‘Fundamental Environmental Rights’.54
As of March 2021, there were 110 countries that had implemented the right to a healthy
environment in their constitution,55 although courts have often been reluctant to enforce
such rights, leading critics to claim that they are largely ineffective.56
2.3. Environmental constitutionalism, nature’s rights and Indigenous rights:
strange bedfellows
There remains a problematic mismatch between human rights and environmental objec-
tives, especially given the ‘anthropocentric’ focus of human rights protection.57 This
anthropocentrism is the core concern of the global ‘rights of nature’58 movement,
which argues for the protection of nature (in both international and domestic legal fra-
meworks) independent of, and perhaps in opposition to, the rights of humans.59 The
legal manifestation of postmodern rights of nature activism is often said to have started
with the Constitution of Ecuador, which incorporated a protection of the rights of Pacha
50See Shapiro and Stone Sweet (2002); Couso, Huneeus, and Sieder (2010).
51Shelton (2006), p 163. See Gilbert (2018).





56Weis (2018), p 838. See generally Gellers (2015) for an empirical study of the countries that have included environ-
mental rights in their constitutions.
57Shelton (2006), p 170.
58We acknowledge that much of the theory on which rights of nature models are constructed, especially the ‘ecotheo-
logical’ theory highlighted in the work of Tănăsescu, makes a moral claim about rights of nature being necessary to
protect ‘Mother Earth’ from the evils of a homogenous and equally responsible ‘Humanity’. Such discourse also has
‘constitutional’ undertones, in terms of referring to a moral political order and what is good for society and the
planet as a whole. See Tănăsescu (forthcoming); See also O’Donnell et al (2020).
59See Boyd (2017).
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Mama (Mother Nature) in 2008,60 although such constitutional rights of nature pro-
visions often sit with other human rights protections, alongside the right to a clean
and healthy environment.61 This maintains the characteristic rights-based approach of
environmental constitutionalism, but argues for the expansion of rights-holders beyond
humans to include the natural environment as a whole, or specific parts of it,62 what
Tănăsescu calls ‘the expanding circle of moral concern’.63
The spread of transnational environmental constitutionalism, and in particular the
extension of human rights protections to nature, also has a close (yet uneasy) relationship
with the increasing recognition of collective Indigenous rights in comparative and inter-
national law.64 The ILO Convention 169, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, and customary international law now recognise Indigenous territor-
ial and environmental rights,65 including both their physical and cultural/spiritual
elements,66 and encourage states to recognise and provide for such rights. With reference
to these international norms and as advocated by the transnational Indigenous rights
movement, governments in Colombia and Aotearoa New Zealand have embarked on
processes for redressing historical and contemporary territorial rights claims by Indigen-
ous peoples; including claims to land, resources, and related political authority. These
claims invariably come before the constitutional courts, or have constitutional impli-
cations.67 In some places, like in Aotearoa New Zealand, this process of claims-making
has led at times to the adoption of legal person models, in an attempt to reflect legal and
ontological pluralism, via western legal concepts that approximate Indigenous law.68
Yet, there is increasing criticism of rights of nature theory and practice (and the
broader project of transnational environmental constitutionalism) from the perspective
of Indigenous rights. This is especially the case, as Tănăsescu points out, for models that
seek to recognise or protect the rights of the totality of ‘Nature’ vis a vis all humanity, as
opposed to the place-based relational models in Aotearoa New Zealand.69 Rights of
nature advocates emphasise alignment between Indigenous belief systems and their ‘eco-
centric’ approaches,70 however, the rights of nature movement has firmly western and
60Constitución de La República de Ecuador [Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador] 2008 (ECU).
61Shelton (2006), p 170.
62Weis (2018), p 858. Environmental constitutionalism is not necessarily restricted to rights-based protections. Weis
explains that ‘most environmental [constitutional] provisions are not conventional rights provisions but provisions
that indicate that the institutional responsibility for fundamental environmental values lie with the political branches
and not with courts.’
63Tănăsescu (forthcoming).
64International Labour Organisation Convention (No 169) 1989; Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP),
Opened for Signature 13 September 2007. Article 26.1 of the UNDRIP states for instance that: ‘Indigenous peoples have
the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or
acquired.’ The UNDRIP, while approved by a large majority of the UN General Assembly, is not legally binding. New
Zealand was among the four countries voting against the UNDRIP, and Colombia one of the eleven countries
abstaining.
65International Labour Organisation Convention (No 169) 1989 articles 13 to 19; UNDRIP articles 25 to 30.
66International Labour Organisation Convention (No 169) 1989 articles 13 and 14; UNDRIP article 25 and preamble.
67In Aotearoa New Zealand these are political settlements of claims made pursuant to New Zealand’s founding consti-
tutional document: Te Tiriti o Waitangi/the Treaty of Waitangi 1840 between Māori and the British Crown. In Colombia,
Indigenous collective rights, including to territory, are guaranteed in the 1991 Constitution. See Macpherson, Torres
Ventura, and Clavijo Ospina (2020).
68See Martuwarra (2020); Te Aho (2009); Morris and Ruru (2010); Watts (2013); Milgin et al (2020), p 1211; Salmond (2017),
p 299; Kauffman (2020). See also James (2020), p 2.
69Tănăsescu (forthcoming). See also O’Donnell et al (2020).
70See, e.g. Boyd (2017); Guzmán (2019).
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non-Indigenous origins,71 and has at times accidentally, and even wilfully, ignored Indi-
genous agency and difference.72 Indigenous peoples have good reason to be suspicious of
the ‘rights revolution’ for nature,73 given their historical experience with liberal legal
constructs.74 Legal personhood or rights of nature activism may detract attention or
energy away from radical Indigenous social and political agendas,75 including the
struggle for Indigenous sovereignty, control and ownership over natural resources and
related political authority.76 These concerns have important implications for environ-
mental constitutionalism, around the need to respect pluralism and avoid repeating colo-
nial injustices by overriding hard-won Indigenous rights.77
2.4. Environmental constitutionalism and symbolism
There are other criticisms of environmental constitutionalism as a normative goal. Kysar
sees it as being largely a ‘symbolic’ exercise, as environmental constitutional provisions
are generally ‘weakly enforced and vaguely specified’.78 Environmental constitutionalism
has been described as ‘green-washing’, ‘in the sense that the environmental provisions are
beautifully written, but the judicial structure and political power-dynamics in the country
is unlikely to permit their implementation’.79 Many of the countries who recognise the
right to a clean and healthy environment, for example, are major polluters.80 The trans-
national comparative project of environmental constitutionalism may be methodologi-
cally fraught, as ‘it assumes that different constitutions are legitimately subjects of level
comparison’, while constitutions are embedded in the (plural) historical, political and
social context of their country.81
From a broader social science perspective, which investigates outcomes with reference
to issues of power, political economy and institutional capacity, the fact that legal texts do
not immediately translate into changed practices comes as no surprise. It is evident that
law does not directly prescribe social practice; that private interests may resist public
values; and that emergent norms are not immediately transformative. As May has writ-
ten: ‘Environmental rights are still adolescents in constitutional time’.82 It would be
wrong to claim that there are no practical implications of environmental constitutional-
ism, and seemingly ‘symbolic’ changes may lead to more significant change in time. Even
if fragmented, at times limited, and dependent on specific contexts, there are increasingly
evident impacts of environmental constitutional provisions, through judicial, executive
71Macpherson (2019).
72See O’Donnell et al (2020).
73To use a phrase coined by Boyd (2017).
74See Birrell and Dehm (2021), p 18. Birrell and Dehm warn of the risks inherent in adopting the liberal idea of the ‘white,
European, male property-owner, which reaches its ‘apotheosis’ in the corporation as juridical person’, as part of a ‘jur-
idical reconstruction and reanimation of the non-human within a modernist rights frame’ given the limitations of rights
discourse as applied to humans.
75Tănăsescu (2020), pp 431–434; Coombes (2020).
76Marshall (2019); Jones (2016), p 176.
77See O’Donnell et al (2020). See also Macpherson, Torres Ventura, and Clavijo Ospina (2020).
78Kysar (2010), p 231. See also Daly and May (2018), p 1 and Geller (2015).
79Daly and May (2018), p 4.
80Daly and May (2018).
81May and Daly (2015), pp 9–10.
82May (2020), p 386.
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or legislative channels.83 This article adds to those examples by examining the influence
of environmental constitutionalism for riverine rights.
3. Riverine rights in comparative law
In this section we explore the recognition or conferral of rights, personhood or subject
hood on particular rivers in Colombia, India and New Zealand, and consider the role
of constitutional law in each case, including whether the riverine rights provided for
have been secured through constitutional processes. In doing so we begin to draw infer-
ences about the constitutional significance of each case, and the implications these might
have for riverine rights to occupy an elevated position of superiority over ordinary
environmental law and regulation.
3.1. Colombia
Colombia is part of the civil law tradition, with a written constitution and primacy of
legislated law. Despite numerous Indigenous peoples already occupying and exercising
sovereignty over the land now known as Colombia, it was colonised by the Spanish in
the fifteenth century, bringing disease, violence and dislocation.84 The Spanish also
brought slaves with them from Africa, as labour for the newly established colony, and
their descendants remained when the Republic of Colombia gained independence
from the Spanish Crown in 1810,85 resisting slavery (‘cimarronaje’) and playing vital
roles in the struggle for independence. However, Afro descendants and their cultures
continued to be persecuted after independence and, to escape and maintain their iden-
tities, many Afro descendent and Indigenous peoples found refuge in isolated jungles,
including those of the Colombian Pacific.
Ideological differences regarding how the republic should be administered have marked
much of Colombia’s legal and political history, and Indigenous (4 per cent of the popu-
lation) and Afro descendent (known as ‘ethnic’; 12–14 per cent of the population) commu-
nities have a long history of resisting violence and defending their way of relating with each
other and the land. Numerous civil wars were fought in Colombia during the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries over whether the republic should be a federal or a unitary state, and
whether it should be guided by liberal or conservative principles. The result of these wars
were successive constitutional reforms, producing a total of fifteen national constitutions
during the twentieth century.86 The triumphant European bourgeois system of the time,
a liberal democracy with its Laissez-faire scheme of minimal state intervention, was trans-
ferred to Latin America, which perpetuated social inequalities inherited from Europe
within a political system that was not made to rectify or correct them.87
Bentham’s Utilitarian Doctrine strongly influenced Colombia’s constitutional and
legal formation process. He believed that institutions and ways of life could be created
and shaped by the appropriate laws, and so, ‘a cult of legality as the supreme embodiment
83Daly and May (2018).
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of constitutional democracy is one of the main sources of the strategy of regulatory refor-
mism of Colombian elites’.88 For these reasons, Colombian constitutions have been
called ‘battle charters’ (cartas de batalla), the result of political battles for constitutional
reform.89
The cult of ‘form’ became the main characteristic of Colombian constitutionalism
until the late twentieth century. The idealisation and mystification of constitutional
texts with disregard for the needs of the non-elite population made Colombia a ‘blocked
society, a nation besieged by republican rhetoric whose leadership seems incapable or
unwilling to share the power of the state and open the avenues of economic development
and democratic modernization’.90 This system endured until the 1990s when Colombia
developed its current constitution.
The 1991ColombianConstitution is one of the ‘typical social rights constitutions’ devel-
oped in Latin America during re-democratisation processes of the 1990s.91 It emphasises
human rights, multiculturalism, environmental protection, and a prevalence of substance
(dignity and social equality) over form (the appropriateness of laws). This new approach
is encapsulated in its overarching framework of the Estado social de derecho, meaning:92
a social state under the rule of law, organized in the form of a unitary republic, decentralized,
with autonomy of its territorial units, democratic, participatory, and pluralistic, based on the
respect of human dignity, the work and solidarity of the individuals who belong to it, and the
prevalence of the general interest.
The 1991 Constitution has been called an ecological Constitution (Constitución ecoló-
gica), because it dedicates more than 30 articles to environmental protection. In particu-
lar, articles 79 and 80 recognise the collective right of all people to a healthy environment
and the responsibility of the State to: protect the diversity and integrity of the environ-
ment; conserve areas of special ecological importance; plan the management and use of
natural resources to guarantee their sustainable development, conservation, restoration
or substitution; and prevent and control environmental deterioration.93
The Constitution also provides important protections of Indigenous and Afro descen-
dent rights.94 Afro-Colombians and Indigenous peoples found an important political
opportunity for the advancement of their rights in the lead up to the writing of the
1991 Constitution. Emboldened by ILO Convention 169, they mobilised for the recog-
nition of their ethnic rights, pushed for the inclusion of a multiculturalism and multieth-
nicity clause in the new Constitution, and argued for a new law to recognise their
territorial rights. Article 330 of the Constitution recognised Indigenous territorial rights
and relationships, and associated law-making power, as part of a reservation system
(resguardos indígenas).95 Law 70 of 1993,96 foreshadowed in transitional article 55 of
88Valencia Villa (1997), p 95.
89Valencia Villa (1997).
90Valencia Villa (1997), p 70.
91Brinks and Blass (2018).
92Heller et al (2021), art 1.
93Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 (COL) arts 1, 2, 8, 49, 79, 86, 88, 95, 333, and 366.
94See generally Macpherson (2019).
95Constitución Política de Colombia 1991 art 330.
96Law 70/1993 art 2 defines ‘Black community’ as ‘the group of families of Afro-Colombian descent who possesses its own
culture, shares a common history and has its own traditions and customs within a rural-urban setting, and which reveals
and preserves a consciousness of identity that distinguishes it from other ethnic groups.’ After the expedition of this law
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the Constitution, recognises the rights of ethnic groups to collectively own the lands they
have traditionally inhabited (called ‘consejos mayores’), and is known in Colombia as la
Constitución negra (the Black People’s Constitution).97 The new approach was based on
ideas of ethnic identity, difference and culture, and enabled Indigenous and Afro descen-
dent claims to be repositioned from equality and political participation, towards collec-
tive rights linked to their distinct culture and a special relationship with the land.98 This
constitutional project demanded not only the demarcation and collective ownership of
land, but respect for racial and cultural difference in opposition to the state’s model of
development,99 pursuant to which ‘se tienen que ir porque llegó el progreso’ (they must
leave because progress has arrived).100
Despite belonging to the civil law tradition, Colombia’s progressive judiciary
(especially the Constitutional Court) has played a key role in developing expansive
and emancipatory justice in Colombia.101 Applying the foundational principle of preva-
lence of equal dignity over legal formalism (and the Estado social de derecho), ‘the judges
themselves define influential visions of democratic constitutionalism, defending or
expanding the welfare state and extending the benefits of socio economic and cultural
rights to previously excluded groups’.102 The Courts have produced a line of jurispru-
dence recognising and protecting the environment,103 and the territorial rights of Indi-
genous and Afro descendent104 communities.
As a civil law country, with a French-style Civil Code (transplanted to Chile by Andrés
Bello and then to Colombia), the Colombian courts traditionally applied strict Roman
law notions of legal persons, family, and contracts. Pursuant to this approach, legal per-
sonality (personalidad jurídica), which confers rights and obligations, could only to be
assigned to humans (personas naturales) and organisations of public and private nature
(personas juridicas públicas y privadas). However, the Colombian courts have developed
a long line of jurisprudence in which they use the concept of the Estado social de derecho
to broaden the notion of legal personality/subjectivity105 to protect the rights of ani-
mals,106 rivers,107 and ecosystems,108 and to treat Indigenous territories as a victim of
Black communities have called for the recognition of diversity within the group, claiming differentiation for other Black
Colombian identities: raizales, palenqueros, comunidades negras and Afro-descendientes
97Lemaitre (2009).
98Lemaitre (2009).
99Lemaitre (2009); Escobar (1997).
100Lemaitre (2009), 379.
101Lemaitre (2009).
102Brinks and Blass (2017), p 302.
103Gustavo Moya Ángel y otros v Empresa de Energia de Bogota y Otros [Gustavo Moya Angel and others v the Bogotá Energy
Company and others] (2014). See Felipe Guzmán Jiménez (2015), p 18. Rio Bogota, in which the Council of State also
made a series of very prescriptive orders in response to serious environmental contamination of the river, although
without recognising that the river was a legal subject
104Consejo Comunitario Mayor Cuenca Río Cacarica v the Ministry of Environment et al (2003) Constitutional Court of
Colombia No T-955 at 81.
105See Calzadilla (2019).
106See, for example Mag Luis Armando Tolosa Villabona (2017). In this case the Supreme Court decided a constitutional
action (habeas corpus) to protect the freedom and integrity of a captive bear. See further Nonhuman Rights Project,
‘Colombian Court Grants Writ of Habeas Corpus to Captive Bear’, https://www.nonhumanrights.org/media-center/07-
28-17-media-release-bear-chucho.
107Richardson and McNeish (2021); Macpherson, Torres Ventura, and Clavijo Ospina (2020).
108See Future Generations et al v Ministry of Environment (2018) Colombia Supreme Court of Justice STC 4360. In this case
the Supreme Court decided a constitutional action (tutela) to protect the rights of children and future generations in the
context of climate change. The plaintiffs alleged that the Colombian State was not fulfilling its Paris Agreement
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the armed conflict.109 These are the building blocks for the decision in the case of the Río
Atrato.110
The Atrato river was recognised by the Constitutional Court of Colombia to be a ‘sub-
ject of rights’ in 2016 as part of a constitutional action (or writ) called a tutela. The case
was presented on behalf of several community councils and Afro-descendant and Indi-
genous organisations that live in the basin and on the banks of the Atrato river, who
sought a declaration that their constitutional rights to life, health, water, and healthy
environment had been violated as a result of the degradation of the river.111
The Atrato river is a tropical river and watershed (45,000 km2), which flows from the
Andes northwards to the Caribbean through the country’s most socio-economically dis-
advantaged region, the Chocó. The region is abundant in natural resources and biodiver-
sity, but has also been a place of conflict and contestation due to its history of plantations,
mining, drug production, armed conflict and slavery. Although a Peace Accord was
signed with the FARC-EP (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército
del Pueblo) – Colombia’s largest guerrilla movement – in 2016, national and international
media and research reveal persistence of armed conflict as one of the areas worst affected
by this ongoing violence.112 The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) guerrilla con-
tinues to be actively engaged in armed struggle with the Colombian army. Dissident para-
military and guerrilla groups, as well as organised crime continue to be actors of violent
conflict in the country. The communities living alongside the river are Afro descendant
(87 per cent), Indigenous peoples (10 per cent) and mestizos [Spanish and Indigenous
descent] (3 per cent).113 They have all been marginalised since the colonisation of the
Americas in the sixteenth century, and are excluded from many aspects of social and pol-
itical life.114 Today almost half the population of Chocó lives in abject poverty, both the
Indigenous and Afro descendent communities of the Atrato river depend on the river for
their physical and spiritual sustenance, and have a deep interconnection with the river as
a ‘space to reproduce life and recreate culture’.115 However, in recent decades, the Atrato
communities have become a target for armed groups who aim to displace them to take
their land for sugar cane, coffee and banana plantations, wood exploitation, mining, and
palm oil plantations, or to exploit their labour for illegal activities.116 The Atrato has been
contaminated with mercury and other toxic pollutants used for mining, and used to
commitments to stop the deforestation of the Colombian portion of the Amazon rainforest. The case was decided in
favour of the plaintiffs and included a declaration by the Court, on its own motion, of violation of the rights of the
Amazon.
109See Izquierdo and Viaene 2018 Decree-Law 4633 of 2017, known as the Law of Victims for Indigenous Communities,
incorporated the notion of territory as victim. Currently, the transitional justice tribunal (JEP), is investigating the
case of violations of the rights of indigenous territory during the armed conflict between the Colombian State and
the Farc-ep (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - People’s Army). Indigenous Magistrate Belkis Izquiero is in
charge of the case See Izquierdo and Viaene (2018).
110Macpherson (2019); Felipe (2020).
111González Serrano (2020); Macpherson, Torres Ventura, and Clavijo Ospina (2020).
112See e.g. ABC Group (2020) ‘Rival illegal armed groups terrify communities in the Rio Quito Chocó, https://reliefweb.int/
report/colombia/rival-illegal-armed-groups-terrify-communities-rio-quito-choc.
113Centro de Estudios para la Justicia Social ‘Tierra Digna’ and Others v the President of the Republic and Others [2016] Corte
Constitucional [Constitutional Court], Sala Sexta de Revision [Sixth Chamber] (Colombia) No T-622 of 2016 (‘Tierra
Digna’).
114Rodriguez Garavito (2012), pp 6–9; Bravo (2017).
115Center for Social Justice Studies et al v Presidency of the Republic et al (2016) Constitutional Court of Colombia T-622 at
165.
116Garavito (2012), pp 6–9; Bravo (2017).
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transport tons of extracted materials, timber, weapons, drugs, and even dead bodies. The
negligent Colombian state has failed to protect the people of the river (and the river itself)
from the adverse impacts of such land uses.117
In 2016, when the Atrato case came before the Constitutional Court, the river had
been severely degraded largely due to illegal resource extraction. The Court brought
the social, economic, and cultural rights together with environmental provisions to com-
prise what it called the ‘biocultural rights’ of the Atrato river and the ethnic communities
living by and from it. The Court found that the State had breached all the constitutional
human rights protections alleged by failing to protect the river and its communities.
Further, the Court recognised the Atrato River, its basin and tributaries, as an entity sub-
ject of rights of protection, conservation, maintenance, and restoration by the State and
ethnic communities.118 Additionally, the Court ordered the creation of several mechan-
isms for the realisation of those rights: a commission of guardians for the river; a panel of
experts to assist the guardians; an integrated watershed management governance body
comprised of national and regional administrative authorities; and a commission for
the eradication of illegal mining and deforestation in the affected areas.119
The Atrato riverine rights case is a clear example of environmental constitutionalism.
The case is a constitutional writ (tutela), and concerns the state’s violation of its consti-
tutional obligation to protect human rights and the environment. But the case has greater
significance within the broader project of modern Colombian constitutionalism, both in
its texts and its judicial application; it is emblematic of the shift from formalism that
favoured the interests of elites, to substantive social ideals of human dignity and respect
for the marginalised or different.120 The Court positions its decision to recognise the river
as a subject of rights as a reflection of the belief-system of ethnic communities, including
the notion of interdependence between humans and nature, applying the legal doctrines
of dignity and solidarity beyond the human. But it is more accurately characterised as
part of the larger battle Colombians of African descent and Indigenous peoples have
been fighting for many years for legal protection of their fundamental rights, and cannot
be understood independently from the history of violence in the region.121
The Constitutional Court’s ruling was surprising for two reasons. First, because it was
decided in favour of people from the most neglected region of Colombia. Secondly, on its
own motion, the Court declared a river to be a subject of rights, disposing of the strict
legal notion of legal personality in favour of the inclusion of non-human subjects. It cap-
tured the imagination of environmental and social activists throughout (and beyond)
Colombia, and has spurred a string of further cases in which rivers, forests and ecosys-
tems have been recognised as legal subjects, using the Atrato case as a ‘precedent’.122
The Court built monitoring mechanisms into its design of remedies, to compel the
various government agencies to undertake the structural changes required for its
117Bonet (2007); Salazar (2020).
118Tierra Digna (n 205).
119Tierra Digna (n 205); Macpherson, Torres Ventura, and Clavijo Ospina (2020); Kauffman and Martin (2019).
120Lemaitre (2009), p 24. This has put the Constitutional Court at the global forefront of constitutional innovation by con-
fronting difficult debates such as the judicialization of social and economic rights, euthanasia, discrimination against
LGTBI people, same sex marriage, quotas of women in public institutions, and abortion.
121Lemaitre (2009).
122See Macpherson, Torres Ventura, and Clavijo Ospina (2020); Colombia Supreme Court of Justice, Mag Luis Armando
Tolosa Villabona (2018).
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implementation. This kind of experimental constitutionalism has been called ‘empow-
ered participatory jurisprudence’, as it aims to be an instance of bounded democratic
experimentalism whereby courts act as catalysts of collective and iterative processes of
collective problem solving.123 Like other unorthodox, structural social rights cases
decided by the Constitutional Court of Colombia, changes have been seen over
time.124 These constitutional cases have served as tools for calling out structural inequal-
ity and creating new governance structures for the state to progressively transform com-
plex problems.125
However, the case remains controversial, both legally and politically, because the
Colombian civil and procedural codes do not contemplate legal rights for natural entities,
which undermines the potential for its implementation. This is compounded by the
weakness of Colombian environmental institutions and the fact that the state has little
influence in Chocó, especially because of the ongoing armed conflict in the region.
This political reality throws light on the ‘implementation gap’ in environmental consti-
tutionalism, and leaves unanswered questions around the need for and efficacy of riverine
rights.
3.2. India
India is a federal state with a unified, common-law legal system. It has a secular, plura-
listic, national constitution, although its norms have been influenced by a combination of
Muslim and Hindu law. Under British colonial rule, pre-existing Hindu and Islamic legal
systems were replaced by a common-law system that was increasingly systematised and
codified in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While this system and many
of its codes were maintained after independence, the government developed a new and
comprehensive written constitution.126
The 1950 Constitution, drafted over three years and approved by a constitutional
assembly, is said to be longest constitution of any independent state. It offers a detailed
outline of the division of power between the institutions of the newly independent state
and is widely credited for forging a robust democratic system with important safeguards
for minorities and vulnerable sectors of society. The Constitution, an elevated-status law
itself, includes different hierarchies of rights. These include ‘fundamental rights’ at the
highest level, which are enforceable by the courts with the power to strike down incon-
sistent acts (like the right to life and liberty in article 21), and lower-level Directive Prin-
ciples of State Policy, which are not directly enforceable by the courts but give important
directives to administrative bodies.127
The Constitution, as approved in 1950, was strong on social issues and equality, but
silent with respect to the environment and its protection. In 1974, theWater (Prevention
123Rodríguez-Garavito (2019).
124Constitutional Court of Colombia Mag Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa 2004. In this case the Court declared that the
humanitarian emergency caused by forced displacement constituted an ‘unconstitutional state of affairs’; See also Con-
stitutional Court of Colombia. Mag. 2008.
125See Rodríguez-Garavito (2010).
126Singh (2018), p 656.
127Constitution of India 1950 (IN) part IV arts 36–51. These are still constitutional rights, and although they are not directly
enforceable by the courts via a power of invalidation have assisted the courts to expand the application of environ-
mental rights to environmental problems. See Chandrachud and Ramanatha (2006).
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and Control of Pollution) Act was passed, opening the way for environmental jurispru-
dence in postcolonial India.128 The Act included water quality measures and regulated
water pollution,129 and empowered states to create the State Pollution Board for its enfor-
cement. This was a concerted effort to respond to India’s growing problem of water pol-
lution,130 yet it was poorly implemented,131 and failed to understand the dynamics of
India’s caste system and embedded ‘colonial notions of fouling and defilement’.132
Two years later, environmental provisions were included in the Constitution through
its 42nd amendment. Importantly, article 48A provides, ‘The State shall endeavour to
protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and wildlife of the
country’, and Article 51A(g), states: ‘It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to protect
and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to
have compassion for living creatures.’ These are not ‘fundamental rights’ but Directive
Principles of State Policy (as defined above),133 although, together with the Water Act,
they made river protection an issue of constitutional importance. Still, their implemen-
tation remained poor.134
The Indian courts,135 especially the Supreme Court, have played an important role in
developing Indian constitutionalism, 136 widening the scope of key protections and intro-
ducing new legal measures.137 The Supreme Court has developed a line of jurisprudence
expanding the ambit of the right to life and liberty, to include, among other things, the
right to food, health, dignity, education, clean air and water and freedom from environ-
mental pollution.138 The Supreme Court also developed a procedure for ‘public interest
litigation’ in the 1970s, as a way to make justice more accessible for the poor and disad-
vantaged. The Court relaxed standing requirements so that a petitioner need not be per-
sonally affected to bring a constitutional case to court, and could bring a case on general
public interest grounds.139 While the initial rationale was to allow litigants to present
cases on behalf of people lacking the economic resources to go to court, the admission
of public interest litigation has also opened the way for environmental public interest
cases to be heard by the Supreme Court.140
There have been successive public interest cases concerning the Ganga river, culmi-
nating in the Supreme Court’s recognition of the human right to a clean and healthy
environment. In 1985 MC Mehta, a lawyer and social activist, petitioned the Supreme
128The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 (IN).
129See The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 (IN) ss 17, 24-25, 32, 43.
130The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1974 (IN).
131Gupta et al (2019), pp 313–327.
132Alley (2002), p 143.
133Bhatia (2019).
134Gupta et al (2019), pp 313–327.
135Neuborne (2003). With the Supreme Court at the apex, India has 21 state High Courts, and numerous subordinate
courts. The Supreme Court also rules on disputes between states and has an advisory function to the executive.
136Krishnamurthy (2009.) With the Supreme Court at the apex, India has 21 state High Courts, and numerous subordinate
courts. The Supreme Court also rules on disputes between states and has an advisory function to the executive.
137Bhatia (2019).
138For instance: Maneka Gandhi v Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597; Kharak Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1963 SC 1295;
Sunil Batra v Delhi Administration AIR 1978 SC 1675; Francis Coralie Mullin v Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi AIR
1981 SC 746; Unni Krishnan v State of AP AIR 1993 SC 645; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v UOI AIR 2001 SC 454;
Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India AIR 2000 SC 375; MC Mehta v Union of India (2004) 3 SCR 128.
139Chandra (2018).
140Faure and Raja (2010).
16 E. MACPHERSON ET AL.
Court about the alarming level of pollution in the Ganga in Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh). The
petition
sought the issue of a writ/order/direction in the nature of mandamus […] restraining them
from letting out the trade effluents into the river Ganga till such time they put necessary
treatment plants for treating the trade effluents in order to arrest the pollution of water
in the said river.141
The Court upheld the environmental protections in theWater Act and the Constitution,
and directed the establishment of primary treatment plants for pre-treating effluent
before release into the Ganga.
In 1986, a broader environmental law was passed (the Environment Act), regulating a
wider spectrum of environmental impacts including the release of hazardous substances.
Mehta drew on this additional law to bring further public interest litigation concerning
the Ganga in 1988, in which the Court found water pollution to be a ‘public nuisance’.142
The Court directed the municipal government to enforce environmental by-laws for the
river, which initially brought down the level of pollution, however, its implementation
was undermined by a lack of institutional capacity and pollution ultimately continued.143
The Ganga cases filed by MCMehta spurred many further environmental cases, even-
tually leading to the Supreme Court clarification in 1991 that: ‘The right to live is a funda-
mental right under Article 21 of the Constitution and it includes the right to enjoyment of
pollution-free water and air for full enjoyment of life’,144 and in 1994 that the right to life:
encompasses within its ambit the protection and preservation of the environment, ecologi-
cal balance, freedom from pollution of air and water, and sanitation, without which life can-
not be enjoyed. Any contract or action which would cause environmental pollution…
should be regarded as amounting to violation of Article 21.145
This constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment, has since been recognised
in hundreds of public interest cases in India, including the 2017 Ganga, Yamuna and Gla-
ciers (riverine rights) cases.146
In 2014, Mohammed Salim filed a public interest application before the High Court in
Uttarakhand, citing the Government’s inaction in the face of illegal occupation and sand
mining in the Ganga. In December 2014 the Court ordered the eviction of squatters, the
end to sand mining, and the establishment of government bodies to enforce the protec-
tion of the river. Three years later, the High Court, dissatisfied with the lack of response
from the State Government, issued a new judgment declaring the Ganga, Yamuna and all
of its tributary, streams as the juristic/living entity having the status of a living person/
legal person.147 The Court used the example of religious idols,148 which were already
recognised as being juridical persons, as a precedent. Since the river cannot speak for
141MC Mehta vs Union of India & Others 1988 AIR 1115; 1988 SCR (2) 530.
142Pollution of water in the river – especially in the Kanpur led to death and sickness. MC Mehta vs Union of India & Ors
1988 AIR 1115; 1988 SCR (2) 530.
143Kelly, Ganga and Gandagi (1994), pp 127-145.
144Subhash Kumar v State of Bihar (1991) AIR 420.
145Virendra Gaur And Ors v State Of Haryana And Ors (1994) 6 SCR 78.
146Boyd (2011), p 174.
147Mohd Salim v State of Uttarakhand & Ors Writ Petition (PIL) No.126 of 2014.
148In the Indian legal system, religious idols are juridical persons, who can sue or be sued. Idols have the status of legal
minor and are represented by legal guardian. See Patel (2010) pp 47–52.
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itself, three state officials were named to act in loco parentis (in the place of a parent),
effectively giving the river the status of a minor.149
Ten days later the same judge of the Uttarakhand High Court decided an unrelated
petition filed by Lalit Miglani for the prevention of further recession of the Gangotri
and Yamuntori Glaciers (the sources of the Ganga and Yamuna rivers), as well as the pro-
tection of nearby forests. The Court pronounced that ‘[T]he Glaciers including Gangotri
& Yamunotri, rivers, streams, rivulets, lakes, air, meadows, dales, jungles, forests[,] wet-
lands, grasslands, springs and waterfalls, legal entity/legal person/juristic person/juridical
person/moral person/artificial person having the status of a legal person… ’.150
The Court in all decisions relied on the obligations to protect the environment in
articles 48A and 51A(g) of the Constitution. But the Court’s reasoning rested on the
idea that these rivers are sacred and personified under Hindu belief-systems, drawing
analogies to the personification of Hindu idols and to common law principles of parens
patriae.151 In the Glaciers judgment, there was also reference to India’s international
environmental commitments, to the moral duty to protect nature, and to New Zealand’s
Te Urewera Act. As Kelly explains, the decisions are a blend of environmental, religious
and constitutional principles, creating something entirely new for the strategic purpose
of enforcing river conservation.152
The Ganga, Yamuna and Glaciers decisions of the Uttarakhand High Court show how
environmental constitutionalism is developing and extending in India. These cases are
attempts to elevate the rights of rivers and ecosystems, where ordinary regulation has
not been able to protect them, embedding notions of sacredness and fundamentalism.153
They build on, and transform, existing constitutional principles to accommodate the
non-human world, evident in other contemporary jurisprudence, such as recent animal
rights cases.154 This attempt at constitutional transformation, of extending the rights of
humans to the natural world, is clearly expressed in the Glaciers decision:
Rivers and Lakes have [the] intrinsic right not to be polluted. Polluting and damaging the
rivers, forests, lakes, water bodies, air and glaciers will be legally equivalent to harming, hurt-
ing and causing injury to [a] person.
Rivers, Forests, Lakes, Water Bodies, Air, Glaciers and Springs have a right to exist, persist,
maintain, sustain and regenerate their own vital ecology system. The rivers are not just water
bodies. They are scientifically and biologically living. The rivers, forests, lakes, water bodies,
air, glaciers, human life are unified and are [an] indivisible whole. The integrity of the rivers
is required to be maintained from Glaciers to Ocean.155
What impact the riverine rights decisions will have in India’s complex socio-ecological
context remains to be seen. Both decisions have been appealed to the Supreme Court by
the Government of Uttarkhand and others, and the decisions have been stayed pending a
149Mohd Salim v State of Uttarakhand & Ors Writ Petition (PIL) No.126 of 2014 at 9.
150Lalit Miglani v State of Uttarakhand (PIL) No. 367 of 2017 at [62].
151Refers to the state in its capacity as the legal guardian of persons not sui juris and without natural guardians, as the
heir to persons without natural heirs, and as the protector of all citizens unable to protect themselves. See Merriam-
Webster Legal Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/parens%20patriae.
152Alley (2019), pp 502, 507–508.
153O’Donnell (2018); Srivastav (2019).
154AWBI v A. Nagaraja (2010) 15 SCC 190.
155Lalit Miglani v State of Uttarakhand (PIL) No. 367 of 2017 at [62].
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hearing.156 It is unclear when they will be heard by the Supreme Court and what the out-
come might be. Critics have pointed out a number of problems with the judgments,
including: the Courts’ reliance on Hindu religious arguments (which sits uneasily with
the secular Constitution of pluralistic India); the jurisdictional difficulty of a state-
based High Court making decisions that impact on other Indian states through which
the Ganga flows (and eventually Bangladesh, where the Ganga reaches the ocean); the
reliance on unwilling government agencies to act as ‘guardians’; a failure to involve
civil society and affected communities;157 lack of clarity on the precise rights (and
responsibilities) ascribed to rivers; and weak or non-existing enforcement
mechanisms.158
Because of the jurisdictional problems with the Indian cases (related to the Federal sta-
tus of water laws), it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will allow them to stand. Yet,
the pollution of the Ganga, discharge of toxic waste from industries, and melting of gla-
ciers due to climate change remain urgent problems. Following the Supreme Court’s
track-record of building environmental constitutionalism in India, the possibility of a
decision that somehow retains the idea of nature’s rights or legal personhood should
not be discounted. The decisions have already had an influence on two subsequent
High Court decisions in Uttarakhand and neighbouring Punjab and Haryana that use
the concept of in loco parentis to protect the rights of animals.159 The High Court of Pun-
jab and Haryana followed in 2020 by giving Lake Sukhna the rights of a living person.
Although, admittedly all three subsequent decisions were made by Justice Rajiv Sharma,
the same judge who decided the Ganga, Yamuna and Glaciers cases.160 Echoes of the
Ganga, Yamuna and Glaciers cases can be found in the decision of the Legislative Assem-
bly of Madhya Pradesh to grant the Narmada river legal personality,161 and in the ways
that Indian environmental civil society organisations are using these decisions to justify
their claims for protection of rivers and other natural entities. Seen this way, the decisions
may be early judicial experiments, which can be built on in later, less jurisdictionally pro-
blematic, test cases, remaining an important first step in a longer process of deepening
environmental constitutionalism.
3.3. Aotearoa NZ
New Zealand, known to its Indigenous Māori iwi and hapū (tribes and subtribes) as
Aotearoa, was settled by the British after the signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (the Treaty
of Waitangi) between the Crown and Māori chiefs in 1840.162 The Treaty is the founding
156Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 016879/2017The State of Uttarakhand and Ors Versus Mohd Salim and Ors Order
dated7 July 2017, stayed the ruling in the Salim case. Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 34250/2017Union of
India vs Lalit Miglani, order dated 27 November 2017 stayed the ruling in the Miglani case. See also Jolly and
Menon (2021), p 3 n 5.
157In the Glaciers judgement, this weakness seems to be acknowledged in the assertion ‘However, we would hasten to
observe that local inhabitants living on the banks of rivers, lakes, and whose lives are linked with rivers and lakes must
have their voice too.’ Yet there are no mechanisms to ensure this.
158O’Donnell (2018); Srivastav (2019); Jolly and Menon (2021); Chaturvedi (2019).
159Narayan Dutt Batt v Union of India (2018) (PIL) No.43 of 2014; Karnail Singh v State of Haryana (2019) CRR 533 2013.
160Sethi (2020).
161Jolly and Menon (2021), p 8. We have been unable to locate any primary sources relating to these cases.
162New Zealand is a constitutional monarchy and part of the British Commonwealth. See generally Joseph (2014).
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constitutional document in New Zealand,163 and sets out a basic agreement for the bicul-
tural nation that emerged.164 Thus, any consideration of constitutional law’s role in, and
impact on, riverine rights in New Zealand begins with, and remains bound by, the
Treaty.165
Compared to Colombia and India, New Zealand constitutional law is complex and
opaque. New Zealand does not have a written constitution in one single document,
and its constitutional norms are spread across a number of pieces of legislation, rules
of the common law, conventions and custom.166 New Zealand also has relatively little
direct constitutional protection of environmental rights or interests.167 The New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act 1990 sets out the main human rights protections usually included in a
written constitution, and attempts to implement the country’s commitments under inter-
national human rights treaties.168 However, the Act is not a ‘supreme law’, and inconsist-
ent legislation that contravenes its human rights prevails over and is not invalidated
despite the contravention.169 The Bill of Rights Act is primarily concerned with civil
and political rights, and includes no recognition or protection of environmental interests,
like the right to a clean and healthy environment, the right to water and sanitation, or the
rights of nature; nor does it refer to environmental objectives, obligations or concerns.
New Zealand human rights law does not even recognise the Treaty of Waitangi or its
principles, nor Indigenous rights more broadly.170
New Zealand’s avoidance of mainstream environmental constitutionalism could be
due to its relative lack of environmental ‘strife’,171 which has driven environmental
reforms in the context of major environmental crises in other countries like India and
Colombia.172 However, the resolution of political claims by Māori iwi and hapū pursuant
to the Treaty of Waitangi has produced some interesting constitutional arrangements
with respect to particular natural resources,173 which have taken place outside core
human rights legislation, and hold particular significance for environmental constitu-
tionalism in New Zealand generally. Indeed, the Treaty was described by the former
Chief Judge of the Māori Land Court as a ‘Bill of Rights’ for Māori and Pākēhā (non-
163See Simon (2016) who makes a case against the Treaty as a foundation of New Zealand as a nation, on the basis of
many chiefs/tribes refused to sign the Treaty and that it has led to a racist, white, patriarchical basis for Crown/iwi
relationships.
164See Jones (2016), p 176; Jones (2018), p 16.
165Coates (2018); Ruru (2018).
166Joseph (2014), p 1.
167The inclusion of environmental rights in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act was proposed by a 2013 Constitutional Advi-
sory Panel. See New Zealand Ministry of Justice (2013). See also Palmer and Butler (2018). Palmer and Butler, leading
New Zealand constitutionalists, have recently called for the including of environmental rights in a supreme Bill of
Rights.
168New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) preamble.
169New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 4. See generally Geiringer (2019), p 282.
170There has been historical resistance to the inclusion of the Treaty or Indigenous rights in the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act, because of Māori concern that to do so would dilute the Treaty’s impact or undermine the succession of Treaty
partnership with the British Crown. See Palmer and Butler (2018).
171See O’Gorman (2017), p 455 who makes this argument around ‘strife’ driving environmental constitutionalism in com-
parative experience.
172Although environmental and social issues are increasingly pressing in Aotearoa New Zealand. A recent Cabinet paper
on the future of the Resource Management Act noted that and 94% of urban streams and 82% of streams in pastoral
areas are not suitable for swimming at least for some of the time, and Māori are still disproportionately represented
negatively across socioeconomic scales. See New Zealand Ministry for the Environment (2020a). Similar observations
were made by the then the Prime Minister’s Chief Science Adviser: Gluckman (2017), p 120.
173See generally Salmond (2017).
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Māori) alike.174 These arrangements include a long and evolving line of jurisprudence
around the domestic force and significance of the Treaty and its principles,175 which
have important constitutional implications,176 and continue to spark constitutional
debate.177 They also include a string of Treaty of Waitangi settlements, and related leg-
islative and policy reform, which attempt to recognise the particular ancestral relation-
ships Māori have with natural resources and establish new power-sharing
arrangements for their governance.178 Amongst these, is the Treaty settlement that
recognises the Whanganui river (Te Awa Tupua) as a legal person, which has been
described in and of itself as a ‘constitution’.179
Since the 1970s, with the influence of pan-global Indigenous activism, the New Zeal-
and Government embarked on a process of attempting to repair the damage done by
colonisation to Māori and the country as a whole. The Crown established the Waitangi
Tribunal, to inquire into and make recommendations for the settlement of historical and
contemporary breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi,180 and began to negotiate and settle
those grievances.181 The Treaty was signed in both Māori and English,182 but there
were significant differences between the two versions, which has provoked ongoing pol-
itical conflict between Māori and the Crown. The Māori version of the Treaty guaranteed
to the Māori tribes ongoing sovereignty (known in Te Reo Māori as tino rangatiratanga)
over their territories and people, while the English version only afforded them ‘undis-
turbed possession’ of their lands, estates, forests, fisheries and other properties.183 For
much of New Zealand’s colonial history, the Treaty was ignored, or (at best) its signifi-
cance downplayed,184 and Māori were subject to repeated social, cultural, environmental
and structural injustices.185 It is a fair assessment that the content, ‘spirit’, implications
and potential of the Treaty in terms of constitutional law remain only partly realised,186
174Quoted in Burrows (2018).
175New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1 NZLR 641. An example of more recent and evolving consti-
tutional jurisprudence is Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-General (2017) 1 NZLR 423.
176The orthodox view in Te HeuHeu Tukino v Aotea District Māori Land Board (1941) NZLR 590 was that the Treaty is only
legally binding where directly incorporated in domestic legislation, but the courts are taking an increasingly generous
interpretation of its relevance. See Coates (2018); Ruru (2018); New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General [1987] 1
NZLR 641. An example of more recent and evolving constitutional jurisprudence is Proprietors of Wakatū v Attorney-
General (2017) 1 NZLR 423.
177See Jones (2016); Coates (2018), p 171. There is a current Māori-led project for ‘constitutional transformation’ underway.
See The Independent Working Group on Constitutional Transformation (2016).
178See, e.g. Waikato-Tainui Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010 (NZ) for the Waikato River, which was
recognised as a ‘living ancestor’ and ‘indivisible whole’ in a similar way to Te Awa Tupua, albeit without legal person-
ality. See also the new policy frameworks for freshwater and biodiversity protection, Ministry for the Environment
(2020b); Department of Conservation (2020). Both of these new policies, discussed below, recognise the interconnect-
edness of people and the environment, with particular reference to Māori ontologies framing natural resources as
living, interconnected, ancestral beings. For an explanation of the Māori worldview and Tikanga with respect to
water see Te Aho (2019).
179Sanders (2018). See Iorns Magallanes (2015) and Tanasescu (forthcoming) for discussion of the Urewera model in
which a former national park is recognised as a ‘legal entity’.
180Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (NZ).
181A framework for negotiation and settlement is provided for in Crown policy See New Zealand Office of Treaty Settle-
ments (2015).
182Māori mostly signed the version in Te Reo Māori (the Māori language).
183Te Tiriti o Waitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi) 1840 (NZ) art 2.
184See Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 NZLR 72 which referred to the Treaty as ‘a simple nullity’.
185These injustices are summarised well in Waitangi Tribunal (2011), ’Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: Report on the Wai 262 Claim’,
https://waitangitribunal.govt.nz/news/ko-aotearoa-tenei-report-on-the-wai-262-claim-released/.
186See also Jones (2016); Coates (2018), p 171. There is a current Miori-led project for ‘constitutional transformation’
underway. See The Independent Working Group on Constitutional Transformation (2016).
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although settlements like that for Te Awa Tupua are pushing the boundaries of New
Zealand environmental constitutionalism.
Te Awa Tupua was recognised as a legal person as part of a Treaty settlement between
the Crown and the Whanganui River iwi (sometimes known as Atihaunui or Ngāti Hau).
This settlement followed aWaitangi Tribunal inquiry into the iwi’s claims with respect to
the river, which took place in the 1990s.187 The Tribunal noted that the river iwi have a
special cultural and spiritual connection to the river, which they revere as a living
ancestor,188 and had maintained their claims to ownership and control of the river
since the signing of the Treaty.189 However, their access to the river for food gathering,
navigation and ceremonial uses had been undermined or obstructed by Crown-author-
ised activity in the catchment, including agriculture, urbanisation, resource extraction
and hydroelectric development. Further, their control and authority over river govern-
ance had been undermined by the vesting of regulatory power (unilaterally and without
compensation) in the Crown,190 which is now exercised by local authorities under the
Resource Management Act 1991, under the broad purpose of ‘sustainable management’.
The Tribunal framed the interests of the Whanganui iwi in the river in terms of ‘own-
ership’ of a ‘single and indivisible entity comprised of water, banks, and bed’, and rec-
ommended the return of ownership of the river to them.191 However, the Crown
maintained that the river could not be owned by the iwi as part of any settlement, as
under New Zealand common law no one can ‘own’ water, which is vested in the
Crown on behalf of the New Zealand public.192 As a compromise, the settlement between
the Crown and Whanganui iwi provided that the river would be given its own legal per-
sonhood, with ownership rights vesting in the river itself.193
The Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 was subsequently
passed to give legal effect to the settlement, and to establish new governance arrange-
ments for the river. The Act recognises the status of the river (and its tributaries) as
‘an indivisible and living whole, comprising the Whanganui river from the mountains
to the sea, incorporating all its physical and meta-physical elements’.194 It declares that
Te Awa Tupua is a legal person, with ‘all the rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a
legal person’,195 which are exercised by the ‘human face of the river’; another entity called
Te Pou Tupua, charged with acting in the river’s interests.196 One representative on Te
Pou Tupua is nominated by the Crown and the other by the Whanganui iwi, who are
required to make decisions by consensus. The Act also establishes a complex, collabora-
tive governance regime for the river involving Māori, municipal and central government
187Waitangi Tribunal (1999), pp 55–56.
188Waitangi Tribunal (1999), p xiii. See also Salmond (2017), p 300.
189Waitangi Tribunal (1999), pp 55–56. Māori brought their claims to the river before the courts in In re the Bed of the
Wanganui River (1962) NZLR 600.
190Waitangi Tribunal (1999), pp 55–56.
191Waitangi Tribunal (1999), p 337.
192This is reflected in theWater and Soil Conservation Act 1967 (NZ) s 21; Coal Mines Amendment Act 1903 (NZ) s 14;Water
Power Act 1903 (NZ) ss 2, 5; Resource Management Act 1991 (NZ) s 354.
193Te Aho (2014). The origins of this idea is usually credited to a 2010 research paper by Ruru and Morris, which referred
to the Ecuadorian and Bolivian rights of nature laws. See Morris and Ruru (2010).
194Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) s 12.
195Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) s 14.
196Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) ss 18–19.
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and private users,197 including a range of entities and encompassing a range of sectorial
and community perspectives.198
The legislation prescribes fundamental values for the river’s management
(called ‘Tupua te Kawa’), which are the ‘intrinsic values that represent the essence
of Te Awa Tupua’,199 and must be taken into account by administrative
decision-makers.200 They acknowledge the river as a source of spiritual and physical sus-
tenance, feeding the resources within it and people living alongside it,201 recognising the
direct link between the health of the river and the health of the people. The values reiter-
ate that the river is an indivisible and living whole from the mountains to the sea incor-
porating physical and metaphysical elements. They also acknowledge the responsibility
of the Whanganui iwi for the river’s health, that the large and small streams form one
river, and the common purpose of all elements and entities in the river working towards
the river’s health and wellbeing.
The Te Awa Tupua model was driven by the concerns of the Whanganui iwi for auth-
ority and control over the river in accordance with their own values (for reasons includ-
ing but not necessarily limited to environmental protection).202 The river values are a
significant embodiment of the customary law of the Whanganui iwi, reflecting their tra-
ditional knowledge as established resource managers,203 and the recognition of the river
as a living ancestor and legal person is an attempt to approximate the iwi’s relationship
with the river.204
The Act can fairly be characterised as ‘constitutional’, as it ‘addresses the structure of
power in New Zealand and provides a framework for interactions between the Crown
and iwi, with particular emphasis on processes and principles which affirm the values
of tikanga Māori (Māori customary law), including encouraging consensus decision-
making’.205 Coates points out the ongoing relational redress inherent in the arrangement,
constituting a ‘subtle and incremental shift in the Crown–Māori constitutional relation-
ship’.206 The Act is an attempt to elevate the interests of the river above ordinary environ-
mental regulation and its competing agendas,207 by establishing ‘fundamental’ agreed
values or objectives for the river (Tupua te Kawa). This elevated legal status reflects
the standing of the river in tikanga Māori as ‘superhuman’,208 with its own life-
essence,209 and the relationship between river and people as ‘God-given’.210
197For a discussion of collaborative governance see Holley and Sinclair (2018).
198Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) ss 27–35.
199See Good (2013), pp 35–36. Good discusses the difficulty, once rights for nature are recognised, of determining the
content of such rights in the absence of the river’s ability to speak for itself.
200Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) s 15.
201Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) s 13(a).
202Tănăsescu (2020), pp 445–446; Sanders 2018; Iorns Magallanes (2015), p 10.
203Macpherson and Clavijo Ospina (2018).
204I have characterised the model as essentially ‘relational’ in Macpherson (2021).
205Sanders (2018), p 231. See also Tănăsescu (2020), p 446. Similarly, Tănăsescu describes Te Urewera as a constitutional
arrangement, which ‘sets the framework for all subsequent legal and political governance of the territory’.
206Coates (2018), p 169.
207Barcan discusses the (attempted) use of legal personhood to transcend ordinary regulation in this way in See Barcan
(2020), p 822.
208Waitangi Tribunal (1999), p 42.
209Waitangi Tribunal (1999), p 39.
210Waitangi Tribunal (1999), p 45.
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However, despite its constitutional significance, the Te Awa Tupua Act does not man-
age to completely transcend ordinary environmental regulation. The Act does nothing to
disrupt the existing distribution of rights held by non-Māori in the river. The water in the
river remains vested in the Crown on behalf of the New Zealand public,211 only the
Crown-owned parts of the bed is vested in Te Awa Tupua, and the settlement has no
impact on other public or private river uses, in a provision that expressly protects the
rights of hydro-electric power generators.212 Nor does the arrangement impact signifi-
cantly on existing governance arrangements for the river under the Resource Manage-
ment Act 1991, which the Waitangi Tribunal has separately observed as being ‘not
Treaty-compliant’.213 In reflection of this, the status of the river as Te Awa Tupua and
the Tupua te Kawa, although a significant embodiment of tikanga Māori, cannot be
determining factors when decisions are made affecting the river under other
legislation.214
The Te Awa Tupua Act has been described as a ‘compromise’ between Indigenous
advocacy and broader Crown strategy,215 and an ‘attempt to reconcile competing
world views with respect to freshwater’.216 In settling with the Crown, the iwi conceded
their claims to territory (at least pending the resolution of Māori freshwater claims at
some point in the future)217 and accepted a non-ownership model, in which the river
owns its bed.218 Māori in other parts of New Zealand have taken their water ownership
claims to the courts, seeking ‘rangatiratanga’ (sovereignty) over all freshwater within
their takiwā (territory).219
Indigenous scholars, including Jones, have pointed out that while the Te Awa Tupua
settlement establishes a framework that reflects a Māori perspective on human relation-
ships with the natural environment, this does not amount to the kind of recognition of
Māori legal traditions that is necessary to establish a just relationship between Māori and
the Crown.220 Legal personality is an imposed, colonial, western legal construct, as dis-
tinct from the Māori worldview that natural landscape features have their ownmauri (or
life force). This similarly leaves the Te Awa Tupua model open to the criticisms (dis-
cussed above) that environmental constitutionalism is weakly implemented, and that
rights of nature/legal personhood reinforce western hegemony within liberal democratic
frameworks that fail to account for legal pluralism.
211In this way, the Te Awa Tupua Act follows the approach taken in a number of earlier settlements, which vested the
beds of rivers and lakes in iwi/hapū groups and focused on bringing Māori and stakeholders together with public auth-
orities as part of co-management arrangements.
212Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) ss 41, 46. According to the media, the hydroelectric
power generator continues to divert 75 per cent of the Whanganui’s headwaters. See Lurgio (2019).
213Waitangi Tribunal (2019), p 65–66. The report criticised the Resource Management Act highlighting the government’s
failure to recognise Māori rights and interests in water and recommended a new Treaty-compliant co-governance
regime, which is currently under reform.
214Te Awa Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017 (NZ) s 15(5).
215Macpherson and Clavijo Ospina (2018).
216Te Aho (2019), p 1618.
217This is the subject of another claim before the Waitangi Tribunal and recent High Court claim to water ownership
brought by another tribe, discussed below.
218Macpherson (2019), pp 119–120.
219Te Rūnanga o Ngāi Tahu, ‘Ngāi Tahu Takes Court Action to Protect South Island Lakes and Rivers’, https://ngaitahu.iwi.
nz/ngai-tahu-takes-court-action-to-protect-south-island-lakes-and-rivers/. There is little available information about
the claim as it is still at the pleadings stage, and the statement of claim is confidential. See Tau v Attorney-General
(2020) NZHC 3063.
220Jones (2016), p 98. See also Te Aho (2019), p 1619 although she acknowledges that it appears to provide the strongest
opportunity for more effective participation by Māori.
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Despite the limitations of the Te Awa Tupua model, the broader regulatory framework
for freshwater (and the environment) in Aotearoa New Zealand appears to be under-
going its own constitutional shift. This shift includes a similar tendency towards greater
recognition of legal pluralism, and the Māori conception of rivers as interconnected, liv-
ing entities, which may suggest a broader influence of ad hoc models like that of Te Awa
Tupua.221 These developments further confirm that the significance of the Te Awa Tupua
model relates little to the conferral of legal personhood, and its key contribution concerns
legal arrangements that support relationships between people and place.222
The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management was revised in 2020. It
adopts as a ‘Fundamental concept’, ‘Te Mana o Te Wai’ (The mana of water),223
which (in language reminiscent of the Te Awa Tupua Act):224
… refers to the fundamental importance of water and recognises that protecting the health
of freshwater protects the health and well-being of the wider environment. It protects the
mauri [lifeforce] of the wai. Te Mana o te Wai is about restoring and preserving the balance
between the water, the wider environment, and the community.
Decision-makers must ‘give effect to’ Te Mana o Te Wai when managing water,225 and
priority must be given to the health of the water ahead of the health needs of humans, and
finally communities to provide for their social, economic, and cultural well-being, now
and in the future.226 The Statement sets out 6 principles relating to the role of Māori
and other New Zealanders in the management of freshwater, which recognise the inter-
connectedness people with water, especially the ‘power, authority and obligations’ of
Māori kaitiaki to care for water on behalf of future generations, as well as water’s own
vitality and agency.227
The Statement also provides for the ‘integrated management’ of freshwater resources
pursuant to the holistic Māori resource management approach, also included in TeMana
o Te Wai, known as ‘ki uta ki tai’ (from the mountains to the sea). This approach recog-
nises ‘the interconnectedness of the whole environment, from the mountains and lakes,
down the rivers to hāpua (lagoons), wahapū (estuaries) and to the sea; and (b) recognise
interactions between freshwater, land, water bodies, ecosystems, and receiving environ-
ments’, and refers to the impact of cumulative effects across ecosystems and the need for
coordination across regulatory institutions.228 It is clear from the Environment Court
decision in Aratiatia Livestock Limited v Southland Regional Council229 that Te Mana
o te Wai is already having a practical impact on water planning in New Zealand, includ-
ing (in that case) the prioritisation of water’s ecological and spiritual health above
resource exploitation for primary production. The Court provides an early discussion
of the meaning and significance of Te Mana o te Wai, which it describes as an, ‘integral
221See also Te Aho (2019).
222See Macpherson (forthcoming) and Tănăsescu (forthcoming).
223Mana does not have a direct translation into English but encompasses ideas of spiritually-sanctioned power, authority
and integrity. See Marsden (2003); Jones (2018), p 17.
224New Zealand Government (2020), para 1.3(1).
225New Zealand Government (2020), para 3.2.
226New Zealand Government (2020), paras 1.3(5), 2.1.
227New Zealand Government (2020), para 1.3(4).
228New Zealand Government (2020), para 3.5.
229Aratiatia Livestock Limited v Southland Regional Council (2019) NZEnvC 208.
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part of freshwater management’230 and, ‘a fundamental shift in perspective around man-
agement of this natural resource’.231
Legislative reform of the Resource Management Act 1991 is also underway,232 which
has major constitutional implications. The reform project follows the Government com-
missioned ‘Randerson Review’, which found that the Act has ‘not sufficiently protected
the natural environment’, and includes ‘[i]nsufficient recognition of Te Tiriti and lack of
support for Māori participation’.233 In February 2021, the Government announced its
intention to repeal the Resource Management Act, and replace it with a new environ-
mental and planning law framework. The Cabinet proposal for the new legislation,
released in February 2021, includes recommendations of constitutional significance,
intended to (amongst other things) ‘protect and where necessary restore the natural
environment (including the capacity to provide for the wellbeing of present and future
generations)’ and ‘give effect to the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi and provide greater
recognition of te ao Maori (Māori worldview), including matauranga Maori (Māori
knowledge)’.234 The Government’s proposal reaffirms the significance of Te Mana o Te
Wai, and the related concept Te Oranga o Te Taiao (the health of the environment),
which:235
Refers to the fundamental significance of the natural environment and the importance of
prioritising its health and wellbeing. It conveys a holistic, intergenerational perspective
expressed well in te ao Maori. In relation to freshwater management, Te Mana o te Wai
has gained widespread acceptance and is now integral to the regulatory regime.
A key finding of the New Zealand experience of riverine rights, therefore, is the potential
for small-scale or ad hoc developments, which ‘represent change and incremental pro-
gress’,236 to set the stage for more fundamental environmental reforms. In this way,
Te Awa Tupua can be seen as a constitutional experiment – indicative of potential
new paths towards transformative change.
4. Riverine rights – a way forward when ordinary legal mechansims fall
short?
The riverine rights cases from Colombia, India and New Zealand are examples of environ-
mental constitutionalism. Each of the cases can be understood as an attempt to work around
the limitations of regulatory frameworks for rivers, by going over and above them and
appealing to fundamental rights and higher-level norms. The transcendent Tupua Te
Kawa in the Te Awa Tupua Act, is an attempt to elevate the ‘fundamental’ rights of the
river and set an ideal standard to influence decision-making about the river. The Atrato
230Aratiatia Livestock Limited v Southland Regional Council (2019) NZEnvC 208 at [21].
231Aratiatia Livestock Limited v Southland Regional Council (2019) NZEnvC 208 at [63].
232In 2017 the Resource Management Act was amended to enable iwi and hapū to enter into voluntary ‘mana whakahono
ā rohe agreements’ (ss 58L-U), intended to increase Māori participation in collaborative governance of local resource
management. In October 2020 the first mana whakahono ā rohe agreement was signed in New Zealand between
Poutini Ngāi Tahu and the West Coast Regional Council.
233New Zealand Resource Management Review Panel (2020), pp 16, 20. The review panel recommended strengthening
references to the Treaty of Waitangi including inserting a new Tiriti clause that would read: ‘To achieve the purpose of
this Act, those exercising functions and powers under it must give effect to the principles of Te Tiriti o Waitangi’.
234Office of the Minister for the Environment (2021), para 28.
235Office of the Minister for the Environment (2021), para 81.
236Coates (2018), p 171.
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river decision seeks to compel regulators to do something about the environmental degra-
dation of the river and social deprivation of the people of Chocó, leveraging the ‘fundamen-
tal’ constitutional rights of Indigenous and Afro descendent peoples. The Ganges, Yamuna
and Glaciers decisions were efforts to force the state to implement pollution control, com-
bining constitutional rights, Directive Principles of State Policy, and Hindu religious norms.
This ‘elevation’ is carried out in each case by organs of the state (the Parliament in the
New Zealand case, and the courts in the Indian and Colombian cases), by strategically
using, interpreting and adapting existing constitutional law mechanisms.237 This
shows creativity on the part of bureaucrats, politicians and Indigenous leaders (in the
case of New Zealand) and activist lawyers and judges (in the case of India and Colombia).
These are clearly strategic cases, and they have made their ‘makers’ famous, sometimes to
the surprise of local and affected people. So it may be a fair characterisation that the
architects of these cases are both ‘learning to play the game better’ and hoping to
‘make their mark’. But in each case, this was done because existing legal mechanisms
were perceived as inappropriate or unable to manage the social and environmental con-
cerns and conflicts with respect to the rivers. In the Colombian and Indian cases the
courts ‘justified their extraordinary actions by noting the need to address serious threats
to important river ecosystems, and the communities that depend on them, in the face of
government inaction’.238 In the New Zealand case, the Treaty negotiators arrived at a
legal mechanism that would respond to iwi concerns about the condition and manage-
ment of the river without having to resolve contentious distributive claims. Each case is
an attempt to rebalance power relations with respect to rivers by providing a relational
forum for negotiation, conflict and compromise about their management and use, and
to varying degrees and in varying respects involves government authorities, Indigenous
and local communities, and other users.239
Does our study of the riverine rights cases support May and Daly’s contention that,
‘[e]nvironmental constitutionalism offers a way forward when other legal mechanisms
fall short’?240 Our observations suggest that this is correct to some extent. Each of the
models recognises distinct Indigenous, spiritual, ethnic or community perspectives in
which rivers are recognised as living entities with their own rights, and attempts to establish
a river governance regime that reflects human responsibility and care for the river. The
socio-cultural and practical implications of this change might be transformational. It
changes the way regulators and communities see rivers, and enables relational legal plur-
alism via the integration of distinct worldviews as new ‘fundamental’ values and objectives.
However, the transformation is not complete. The Te Awa Tupua Act, for example, fails
to impact significantly on existing regulatory frameworks under the Resource Management
Act, and does nothing to disturb the existing distribution of property rights in the river. The
Atrato decision has, so far, had no direct impact on existing legal or illegal uses of the river,
and it is hard to see how a weak and absent state will be able to implement the Court’s
orders. The orders in the Indian cases are stayed pending appeal, and there are major jur-
isdictional and technical issues with the judgments, meaning that they may not be upheld
237See Kauffman and Martin (2019), p 262 who make this observation around the role of judges in the Indian and Colom-
bian cases.
238Kauffman and Martin (2019), p 262.
239Macpherson (forthcoming).
240May and Daly (2015), p 18.
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when they eventually come before the Supreme Court. This leaves the riverine rights models
open to the criticisms often levelled at environmental constitutionalism, of being at best
weak or symbolic, and even worse, to produce unintended complications during implemen-
tation.241 This suggestion of ‘implementation gap’ leaves unanswered questions around
whether riverine rights can fare any better than the ineffective environmental laws and insti-
tutions they are directed to transcend, and as the riverine rights cases inspire similar devel-
opments around the world, further empirical investigation into their implementation is
needed to understand whether they are effective or produce unintended consequences.242
It is important to remember that in all three cases, environmental or human rights
objectives could have been achieved without the recognition of the river as a legal person
or subject. Public interest law standing, to bring constitutional law action on behalf of the
environment and affected communities exists in all three jurisdictions. Which leaves us
with the unavoidable impression that the constitutional significance of the riverine rights
cases goes beyond the strictly legal.
The most significant finding from our comparative study is that the three ad hoc riv-
erine rights cases (‘still adolescents in constitutional time’)243 are beginning to have
broader, yet profound, influence on mainstream environmental regulation. In New Zeal-
and, the incorporation of Māori law and custom with respect to rivers in the Te Awa
Tupua Act appears to be spreading throughout the broader regulatory framework,
through concepts like Te Mana o Te Wai, which recognise the living and interconnected
state of water resources and communities. The Indian cases have spurred a series of
further rights of nature and animal rights decisions. In Colombia, the Atrato case has
been plagued by complaints of poor engagement and implementation, but it has pro-
voked a cascade of further judicial, administrative and legislative cases and proposals
pursuant to which natural resources and their ecosystems have been recognised as
legal subjects. The impact of these cases has spread beyond their borders, to inspire
courts, legislatures, administrations and communities around the world.
It may not surprise, given their constitutional significance, that the riverine rights
cases would have broader public influence as a ‘model standard for legitimacy’.244 A
key finding of our comparative study, therefore, is that small-scale or ad hoc develop-
ments may set the stage for more fundamental environmental reforms. In this way,
the early riverine rights cases in New Zealand, India and Colombia can be seen as a con-
stitutional experiment – revealing potential new paths towards transformative change.
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